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VALIDITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
Michael Moretti, a Chicago police officer on the staff of the State's Attorney
of shooting and killing two youths
of Cook County, was arrested on charges
in the aftermath of a tavern brawl.1 The State's Attorney disqualified him-2
self as prosecutor in the case because he was expected to testify as a witness.
The Criminal Court of Cook County thereupon appointed a prominent
Chicago attorney, Harold Smith, as special prosecutor.
While Michael Moretti was awaiting trial upon a murder indictment, the
special prosecutor presented a petition to the Criminal Court alleging that
Moretti's three brothers had attempted by bribes and threats to influenc& the
testimony of the wounded youth who was to be the state's principal witness.
The petition requested instructions from the court regarding the bribery
matter and the court entered a general order directing Smith to proceed
with a prosecution against the MVToretti brothers for bribery. Their subsequent
conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.3
Defendants' principal contention was that the appointment of special
prosecutor Smith did not conform to the Illinois State's Attorney Statute4
and hence any indictment procured by him was void.5 Under this statute
the court may appoint a special prosecutor whenever the State's Attorney
"is sick or absent or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or proceeding.

. .

which.

. .

is . . .pending.

.. ."

Since neither the petition nor the court's order specified that the State's
Attorney was sick, absent, or interested in the alleged crime, the defendants
jurisdicargued that the court had no jurisdiction; and that even assuming
tion, no reason existed for the removal of the regular officer.6 The supreme
court, however, upheld the appointment saying, "the court~knew of the disqualification of the State's Attorney in the Michael Moretti case and could in
the exercise of its judicial discretion determine that justice could be best
disqualifying him in prosecuting members of Michael Morreti's
served by
7
family. "1

In Illinois, jurisdiction to decide whether a proper case for appointment
exists may be acquired in several ways. A petition by a citizen s or by the
officer disqualified 9 has been held sufficient. A majority' 0 of jurisdictions
1.

Convicted of murder in People v. Moretti, No. 51C 1823, Criminal Court of Cook

County (1952).
2. For a discussion of disqualification see Note, 29 3. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1939).
3. People v. Thomas Moretti, 349 Ill. App. 67, 109 N.E.2d 915 (1952).
Declared constitutional in Tearney v. Harding, 335
4. ILL. Rav. STAT. C. 14- §6 (1953).
I1. 123, 166 N.E. 526 (1929).
5. People v. Thomas Moretti, 415 Ill.398, 114 N.E.2d 337 (1953).
6. Brief for Appellants, p. 19-26., People v. Thomas Moretti, 415 I1. 398, 114 N.E.2d

337 (1953).
7. Supra note 5, at 403, 114 N.E.2d at 339.
8. People v. Northup, 184 Ill. App. 638 (1914).
9. Lavin v. Board of Commissioners, 245 I1. 496, 92 N.E. 291 (1910).
10. Palaez v. State, 107 Fla. 50, 144 So. 364 (1932) ; State v. Henderson, 123 Ohio St.
474, 175 N.E. 865 (1931) ; Nance v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 379, 273 Pac. 369 (1929); State
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appear to agree that in the interest of justice an inherent power exists apart
froni statute which enables a court to appoint a substitute when the regular
officer is disqualified or absent.1 ' In Wilson v. County of Marshall,'2 the
county board, after disqualification of the regular prosecutor, had employed
special attorneys in a criminal proceeding not yet initiated. The State's
Attorney Statute was not applicable because by its terms it refers only to
pending cases. The appointments, however, were held valid by virtue of the
court's inherent power.'3 Thus Illinois follows the majority and treats the
statute as being non-exclusive and merely declaratory of the common law.
Returning to the defendants' contentions, it becomes clear that the specific
statutory reasons for removal need not be incorporated in a petition for a
court to acquire jurisdiction. The statute merely says that when certain
circumstances are present, the court may appoint a special State's Attorney.
It is silent as to how these circumstances are to be brought to the court's
attention. The court had inherent power to designate Smith special prosecutor even if a petition were never presented. Moreover, a petition bringing
the facts to the court's attention and requesting instructions was submitted by
special prosecutor Smith. Smith as a citizen had the power to invoke the
court's jurisdiction.
The supreme court, however, upheld the validity of the appointment on a
different theory. The court reasoned that the appointment was within the
jurisdiction of the court by means of a caual connection since the brothers
were interfering with the prosecution of the Michael Moretti case.' 4 This in
effect is a holding that they are really part of the same case and that the
State's Attorney's petition in the Michael Moretti case also disqualified him in
the bribery case.
However, this analysis seems tenuous in that there are actually different
cases with different defendants charged with different crimes. Even if the
brothers were interfering with the court's order in the Michael Moretti case,
the core of defendants' argument is that the regular State's Attorney could
deal with this interference. Thus most of defendants' contentions are directed
at the propriety of the appointment which the court's causal connection
theory does not answer since it is only an unnecessary attempt to find jurisdiction which exists inherently.
It is submitted that a sounder approach would be to apply the de facto
doctrine,' 5 which may be illustrated by the following Illinois cases. In
Lavin v. Board of Commissioners,16 a citizen sought to enjoin payment to a
special attorney appointed to investigate election frauds, alleging that the
elected State's Attorney could have performed such duties. Since the appointv. Gauthier, 113 Ore. 279, 231 Pac. 141 (1924); State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83
(1924).
11 Other states rely on implied legislative sanction to appoint in such a situation.
State v. Criminal Court of Marion County, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1934).
12. 257 Ill. App. 220 (1930).
13.

Id.

at 225.

14. People v. Thomas Moretti, 415 II. 398, 403, 114 N.E.2d 337, 339, (1952).
15. Illinois: People v. Bangs, 25 I1. 184 (1860) ; People v. Lycan, 314 I1. 590, 115 N.E.
595 (1924), along with certain other jurisdictions, has previously recognized this doctrine,
McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895); State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d
895 (1941) ; Walker v. State, 93 Fla. 1096, 113 So. 96 (1927).

Some States which do not,

in

effect accomplish nearly the same result by means of a strong presumption that a special
prosecutor has been legally appointed. Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S.W. 838 (1891).
For an extended discussion see CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE D- FACTIO
DOCTRINE §405 (1910).

16.

See note 9 supra.

